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Abstract
A pure Hotelling game is a competition between a finite number of players who select
simultaneously a location in order to attract as many consumers as possible. In this
paper, we study the case of a general distribution of consumers on a network generated
by a metric graph. Because players do not compete on price, the continuum of consumers
shop at the closest player’s location. Under regularity hypothesis on the distribution we
prove the existence of an ǫ-equilibrium in pure strategies and we construct it, provided
that the number of players is larger than a lower bound.
JEL Classification: C72, D43, R30
Keywords: approximate Nash equilibria, pure equilibria, location games on networks, Hotelling
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1 Introduction
1.1 General and pure Hotelling games
The seminal paper of Hotelling [1929] introduced a model of spatial competition that we
now refer to as Hotelling games. It considers the competition between two retailers along a
segment where consumers are assumed to be uniformly distributed. In the unique equilib-
rium both players set their shop in the middle of the segment. A large literature generalized
the model and two different classes appeared: the general Hotelling game, where players
can decide of their location and also of a selling price. In this framework, a cost function
is introduced to model the cost of moving for the consumers. The existing results mostly
concern very simple sets of possible locations, as described in the following review of the
literature. On the opposite, another part of the literature studies further the case of pure
Hotelling game, where the price is not under control of the players. This model applies
particularly to the sell of products whose price is fixed, such as newspapers sellers or brand
products retailers.
∗This research was supported by the ISF grant 1585/15
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The current paper belongs to the second literature, where the assumption of fixed prices
makes possible the analysis of the interaction between a larger number of players on more
evolved networks for players and consumers. Even though the study of the segment is useful
to understand better the dynamics of the interactions, it appears that the network plays an
important role in the problem. The network we study in this paper is the one introduced
in Pa´lvo¨lgyi [2011] and Fournier and Scarsini [2014] and can model a city, where consumers
are distributed along different streets that eventually intersect each other. We use a metric
graph and suppose that consumers are distributed along the edges, i.e. at convex combina-
tions between two linked vertices. Players can choose a location anywhere in this network
and consumers buy a fixed quantity of goods at the closest store. The payoff of the players
is the amount of consumers that shop at their store.
Pure Hotelling games often assume that consumers are uniformly distributed along the
network. This hypothesis simplifies the analysis but is restrictive: such a model does not
take into account the irregularities inherent to a city, such as higher density in city centers.
This consideration can not be handled by simple modifications on the network (using dilata-
tion or contraction arguments for example): players care about the distance with respect
to the distribution of consumers but consumers are going to the closest player’s location
regardless of the distribution of the other consumers.
In this paper, we consider a general distribution of consumers and only assume that
this distribution is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, that can
easily be defined on the metric graph. We prove though counterexamples that no general
results hold on the existence of exact Nash equilibrium, neither on the existence of approx-
imate Nash equilibrium for an arbitrary number of players. Our main result is that if the
distribution of consumers has a positive, bounded and smooth density with respect to the
Lebesgue measure, then for any ǫ > 0 there exists an ǫ-equilibrium in pure strategies in
the pure Hotelling game, provided that the number of players is larger than a lower bound.
We give a constructive proof and an explicit bound N(ǫ) on the number of players. The
ǫ-equilibrium is both additive and multiplicative.
A brief survey of the literature on pure Hotelling games is made in subsection 1.2. We
give a formal description of the problem in 2. We state the main result in section 3. In
section 4 we provide the announced counterexamples. The section 5 is devoted to the proofs.
1.2 Literature
We now discuss the closely related articles, that have in common with the current paper
either to be concerned with the class of pure Hotelling games (where only the choice of lo-
cation is under the control of the players), or to study the case of non-uniform distribution
of consumers, or to consider interactions on networks similar to the one considered in the
current paper.
Let first discuss the case of papers concerned with pure Hotelling games. Peters et al.
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[2015] consider a uniform distribution of consumers on the unit interval. Consumers take
into account their travel distances to their closest player’s location, but also their expected
queuing times, which depend on the number of consumers choosing the same firm. They
provide existence of a refined equilibrium in several particular cases where the number
of players is small and even. Nu´n˜ez and Scarsini [2014] and Nu´n˜ez and Scarsini [2015]
consider a pure Hotelling game with a finite set of predefined possible locations for the
sellers. In a mimeo, Pa´lvo¨lgyi [2011] considers pure Hotelling games on the same network
that the current paper, but with uniform distribution of consumers. He states that there
always exists a pure Nash equilibrium when the number of players is large enough and
provides a constructive proof in some particular cases. He also studies some equilibrium
structural properties. Fournier and Scarsini [2014] give a general proof for the existence
of a pure Nash equilibrium with a large number of players and a uniform distribution of
consumers. They also measure the efficiency of the equilibrium. Similarities and differences
between Pa´lvo¨lgyi [2011], Fournier and Scarsini [2014] and the current paper methods for
constructing an equilibrium with the adequate properties will be discussed in subsection 5.2.
We now discuss papers concerned with non uniform distribution of consumers in Hotelling
games. Eaton and Lipsey [1975] study, among a lot of different models, the case of a general
distribution of consumers on the unit interval, in the slightly different setting where two
players cannot choose the same location. They show that Hotelling’s original results only
hold under strong hypotheses. Lederer and Hurter Jr [1986] consider a model where con-
sumers are non uniformly distributed on the plane, and study the interactions between two
different firms. Neven [1986] analyzes the general location-then-price Hotelling game with
two players on the unit interval. He considers increasing densities of consumers towards
the center and shows that for some distribution, the two firms locate at opposite ends of
the market. Anderson et al. [1997] also examines a duopoly in a general Hotelling game,
with log-concave density of consumers. He proves that there exists a unique equilibrium in
pure strategies if the density is not ”too asymmetric” and not ”too concave”. Montes-Rojas
[2015] considers a two stages location-then-price game on the unit interval with non-uniform
distribution of consumers. Under strong conditions on the distribution, he studies a refine-
ment of Nash equilibrium and provides an algorithm to analyze some comparative statics.
We now discuss the papers concerned with Hotelling games on a network similar to the
one considered in the current paper. Pa´lvo¨lgyi [2011] and Fournier and Scarsini [2014] are
already mentioned above. Heijnen and Soetevent [2014] consider such a network and study
the general location-then-price Hotelling game with 2 players. Some papers consider the
graph structure, but suppose that players can locate only on the vertices of the graph, such
as Mavronicolas et al. [2008] or Feldmann et al. [2009].
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2 The game H (n,G, f)
In this section we give a formal description of the model. H (n,G, f) is the game where
n ≥ 2 players1 select simultaneously a location in a set G, and where the consumers are
distributed on G according to the density function f with respect to the Lebesgue measure.
The network G is defined in subsection 2.1, and the normal form of the game, including
payoffs, is given in subsection 2.2.
2.1 The network G
The network G on which consumers are distributed is also the set of possible actions for the
players. To define formally G, we need a triplet (V,E, λ) where V is a finite set of vertices, E
is a finite set of edges and λ is a vector of length on E. For simplicity we suppose the graph
(V,E) to be connected. If the edge e ∈ E links the vertices u and v we denote it (u, v). In
our network, players and consumers are not only located in the vertices of the graph but also
along the edges. A point along the edge (u, v) is defined as a convex combination of u and v.
The network G is then defined as the set G := {(u, v, t)|u, v ∈ V, (u, v) ∈ E, t ∈ [0, 1]}, and
a point in G is called a possible location. If a possible location y is chosen by at least one
player for a given actions’ profile, it is then referred to as a location (or chosen location) of
this profile. We give an arbitrary orientation to every edge to avoid the confusion between
(u, v, t) and (v, u, 1 − t) that both refer to the same location.
We now endow the set G with a metric d that represents the distance that consumers
have to travel to go from one point to another in the network. For a given vector of length
λ = (λe)e∈E, λe > 0 is referred to as the length of the edge e. From λ, we derive a distance
d on G as follows: if x1 and x2 are 2 points in the same edge e, they can be written as
x1 = (u, v, t1) and x2 = (u, v, t2) for some t1, t2 ∈ [0, 1]. The distance between x1 and x2 is
d(x1, x2) = λ(u,v) × |t2 − t1|. If x and y are not in the same edge, we consider P (x, y) the
set of paths between x and y as the set of all sequences (x1, . . . , xn) with finite n such that
x1 = x, xn = y and such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, xi and xi+1 belong to the same
edge. The distance d(x, y) is then defined as:
d(x, y) := inf
(x1,...,xn)∈P (x,y)
n−1∑
i=1
d(xi, xi+1)
Given a profile of actions (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ G
n for the players, we can compute how the
consumers split: they shop to the closest player’s location (ties are discussed in subsection
2.2).
The distribution of consumers plays its role in the players’ payoffs. We first introduce
the useful notion of interval [x1, x2] ⊂ (u, v): let x1 := (u, v, t1), x2 := (u, v, t2) and suppose
without loss of generality that t1 < t2. Then [x1, x2] is defined as the set of {(u, v, t)} for
1In the case where n = 1 player, every location attracts all the consumers and is therefore a pure
equilibrium.
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t ∈ [t1, t2].
2 The terminology interval comes from the straightforward isometric identifica-
tion between [x1, x2] and the real interval [t1λe, t2λe] when the edge e is fixed. If there is no
possible confusion on e, we sometimes use the abuse of notation [t1λe, t2λe] to denote the
interval [x1, x2].
The Lebesgue measure on G is denoted L and can easily be defined as a natural ex-
tention of the Lebesgue measure on a real interval. A subset of G can indeed be identified
with a finite union of subsets of intervals. The uniform distribution is the case where G is
endowed with the measure L . In our model, it corresponds to the case where f = 1, i.e.
f(x) = 1 for every x ∈ G. This situation is studied in Pa´lvo¨lgyi [2011] and Fournier and
Scarsini [2014]. In this paper, we extend the model to a general non-atomic distribution µ
with density function f : G→ R+ with respect to L . For a subset A ⊂ G, the quantity of
consumers located in A is: ∫
A
f(x)dL (x)
For simplicity, we sometimes use the arbitrary orientation to identify the restriction of f
on an edge e with a real function fe : [0, λe]→ R
+. When three chosen locations x1, x2, x3
belong to the same edge e, and if the orientation is such that 0 ≤ x1 < x2 < x3 ≤ λe, we
say that the location x1 (resp. x3) is the left (resp. right) neighbor of x2 if there is no other
chosen location between x1 and x2 (resp. between x2 and x3).
Finally remark that we can remove any vertex v with degree 2 and consider the new
edge (u,w), instead of (u, v) and (v,w). In this case we set λ(u,w) = λ(u,v) + λ(v,w). From
now on, we can assume without loss of generality that all vertices have a degree different
from 2.
2.2 The normal form of the game H (n,G, f)
H (n,G, f) is the Hotelling game on G with n players and with a distribution f of con-
sumers. Its normal form is given by a finite set of players {1, . . . , n}, the action set G which
is the same for every player, and the payoff function p := (pi)i∈{1,...,n} that depends on the
chosen profile of actions. We first give an intuitive definition of the payoffs, and equation
(2) gives a formal definition.
The payoff of a player is the quantity of consumers that are going to his shop. A location
xi ∈ G attracts all the consumers who are closer to xi than to any other location, plus a
share of the consumers who are as close to xi as to some other locations (all these locations
get an equal part of the consumers). The total quantity of consumers that shop in xi splits
equally between the different players in xi.
The payoff function has to consider that a location can have different ties with different
other locations. More precisely, for a subset A of an actions’ profile {x1, . . . , xn}, DA is
2Respectively, we define [x1, x2[, ]x1, x2], and ]x1, x2[ as the set of {(u, v, t)} for t ∈ [t1, t2[, ]t1, t2], or
]t1, t2[.
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the set of point in G that are at the same distance from all locations xi ∈ A and that are
strictly closer to them than to any other location. Formally, for A ⊂ {x1, . . . , xn}:
DA = {y ∈ G : d(y, xi) = d(y, xj) for all xi, xj ∈ A
and d(y, xi) < d(y, xℓ) for all xi ∈ A, xℓ 6∈ A}.
(1)
The domain of attraction of a location xi ∈ G refers to the points in G that are (weakly)
closer to them than to other locations, i.e.
⋃
A⊂{x1,...,xn}
xi∈A
DA.
All locations in A get an equal part of µ(DA). Moreover, all players in a same location
get the same payoff. Formally, the payoff of the player i when the profile of strategy
x = (x1, . . . , xn) is played is:
pi(x) =
1
Card({j ∈ {1, . . . , n} : xj = xi})
∑
A⊂{x1,...,xn}
xi∈A
µ(DA)
Card(A)
. (2)
where µ(DA) =
∫
DA
f(x)dL (x). From now on, we use the notation dx instead of dL (x).
This payoff function has a symmetry property: the payoff of a player does not depend
on the identities of the other players. Therefore, the fact that a profile x is or not an
equilibrium does not depend on the identities of the players. We sometimes use the term
configuration to talk about a profile of actions.
3 Existence of ǫ-equilibrium in H (n,G, f)
In this section, we state our main result on the existence of ǫ-equilibrium in H (n,G, f) in
pure strategies.
Definition 1. A profile of actions x := (x1, . . . , xn) is a multiplicative ǫ-equilibrium of
H (n,G, f) in pure strategies if and only if for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and for all y ∈ G we have:
pi(x1, . . . , xi−1, y, xi+1, . . . , xn) ≤ (1 + ǫ)pi(x)
x is an additive ǫ-equilibrium of H (n,G, f) in pure strategies if and only if for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and all y ∈ G, we have:
pi(x1, . . . , xi−1, y, xi+1, . . . , xn)− pi(x) ≤ ǫ
We now define two conditions on the density function f .
(C1): The function f is K-Lipschitz with respect to the distance d on S.
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(C2): The function f is positively upper and lower bounded: there exist m,M ∈]0,∞[ such
that for all y ∈ G, 0 < m ≤ f(y) ≤M
Theorem 2. Existence of ǫ-equilibrium.
Let G be the network generated by any connected graph (V,E) and λ be any vector of
lengths. Suppose that f satisfies (C1) and (C2). For all ǫ > 0 there exists an integer N(ǫ)
such that when the number of players n is larger than N(ǫ), there exists a multiplicative
ǫ-equilibrium in pure strategies in H(n,G, f).
We give a constructive proof where N(ǫ) can be taken equal to:3
5Card(E) +
⌈
5L(M + ǫm12+ǫ)
m− ǫm12+ǫ
(
(12 + ǫ)K
2ǫm
+
1
minλe
)
+
3LK(12 + ǫ)
2ǫm
⌉
where L :=
∫
S
f(x)dx is the total quantity of consumers in the network, and minλe denotes
the minimal length among the set E of edges.
Remark 3. We can weaken condition (C1) to the following condition: The restriction of
f on (0, λe), the interior of any edge e, is K-Lipschitz. With such a condition, the function
f can be discontinuous in the vertices.
Remark 4. There exists also a lower bound N ′(ǫ) on the number of players that guarantees
the existence of an additive ǫ-equilibrium in pure strategies in H(n,G, f). Because the
payoff of any player is always bounded by L, this existence is just a corollary of Theorem 2.
Nevertheless, such a result is somehow trivial: when the number of players is large, their
payoffs are small because they share the fixed quantity L, and any profile of actions turns
to be an additive equilibrium.
Proof. The proof of theorem 2 is detailed in section 5. We give here a sketch of the proof.
The first step is detailed in subsection 5.1: we approximate the density function f by a
step function g(ǫ1), where ǫ1 is a parameter playing a role in the length of the steps. We
prove that because f is K-Lipschitz, the step function g(ǫ1) is such that ‖f − g(ǫ1)‖∞ ≤ ǫ
when ǫ1 is small enough.
The second step is detailed in subsection 5.2: we give a constructive proof that if (C2)
holds, there exists an (exact) equilibrium in pure strategies in the game H (n, S, g(ǫ1)),
where consumers are distributed according to the density function g(ǫ1), and where the
number of players n is larger than a lower-bound N(ǫ1). This lower bound increases when
ǫ1 goes to zero.
We conclude in subsection 5.3 by showing that if ǫ1 is small enough, the equilibrium
constructed in the previous step is a multiplicative ǫ-equilibrium in the game H (n, S, f),
where the distribution of the consumers is given by the function f . We obtain therefore
a lower bound N(ǫ) on the number of players n that guarantees the existence of a pure
multiplicative ǫ-equilibrium in H (n, S, f).
3In particular that N(ǫ) ∼ 1
ǫ
when ǫ→ 0
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4 A few counterexamples
In this section we provide counterexamples to naive extensions of the state-of-the-art re-
sults. The counterexample also illustrate how the analysis of game H (n, S, f) with a general
distribution of consumers f is fundamentally different from the analysis of the game with
uniform distribution of consumers H (n, S,1), where 1 stands for the constant function
x ∈ G 7→ 1. They also highlight the necessity to consider games with a large enough num-
ber of players.
Proposition 5 shows that on the simple network composed of only one edge of length 1,
identified with [0, 1], it is possible to have existence of exact equilibrium in H (n, [0, 1],1)
but non existence in H (n, [0, 1], f) even when f is arbitrary close to 1. More precisely, it
is proved in Eaton and Lipsey [1975] that for any n ≥ 4 there exists an equilibrium in pure
strategies in the game H (n, [0, 1],1). In the case of non uniform distribution of consumers,
it is claimed that in the slightly different framework where two players can not chose the
same location, there exist some density distributions f such that the game H (n, [0, 1], f)
doesn’t admit any equilibrium in pure strategies for n ≥ 3. We give here a more precise
result and provide an extensive proof that also covers the case where several players are
allowed to play in the same location. Proposition 5 is also a counterexample to a possible
generalization of the existence of exact equilibrium for a large number of player, as proved
in Fournier and Scarsini [2014] for uniform distribution.
Proposition 5. For any ǫ > 0, there exists a density function f such that ‖f−1‖∞ ≤ ǫ and
such that H (n, [0, 1], f) doesn’t admit any Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for n ≥ 3.
Proof. Fix an ǫ > 0 and let f : [0, 1] → R+ defined by f(x) := 1 + ǫx. It is clear that
‖f − 1‖∞ ≤ ǫ. Suppose now that x = (x1, . . . , xn) is an equilibrium. Without loss of
generality we assume that x1 ≤ · · · ≤ xn.
We first claim that all players are coupled, i.e. that x1 = x2 < x3 = x4 < · · · < xn−1 =
xn.
4
Suppose that m ≥ 3 players share the same location xk = xk+1 = · · · = xk+m−1 with
m ≥ 3 players. xk−1 (resp. xk+m) is its left (resp. right) neighbor (if it has one). We denote
xk−1,k =
xk−1+xk
2 and xk+m−1,k+m =
xk+m−1+xk+m
2 . In the case where xk does not have a
left (resp. right) neighbor we set xk−1,k = 0 (resp xk+m−1,k+m = 0).
Dxk , the domain of attraction of xk, is equal to the union of the two intervals [xk−1,k, xk]
and [xk+m−1, xk+m−1,k+m] (see the red and green intervals in figure 1 below).
| | | | |
xk−1 xk−1,k xk = xk+m−1 xk+m−1,k+m xk+m
Figure 1: Domain of attraction of xk
The payoff of player k is then equal to:
4This results implies in particular that there is no equilibrium with an odd number of players.
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pk(x1, . . . , xn) =
1
m
∫
[xk−1,k,xk]∪[xk,xk+m−1,k+m]
(1 + ǫx)dx
Because m ≥ 3, we have either:∫
[xk−1,k,xk]
(1 + ǫx)dx > pk(x1, . . . , xn)
or: ∫
[xk,xk+m−1,k+m]
(1 + ǫx)dx > pk(x1, . . . , xn)
But player k could get a payoff arbitrary close to
∫
[xk−1,k,xk]
(1+ ǫx)dx by playing xk − δ for
a δ small enough, or arbitrary close to
∫
[xk,xk+m−1,k+m]
(1 + ǫx)dx by playing xk + δ for a δ
small enough. It proves that at equilibrium, it is not possible that 3 or more players share
a location.
Suppose now that there exists a location xk ∈ [0, 1] with a single player k. This player
has a left neighbor xk−1 (resp. a right neighbor xk+1), otherwise he would have a profitable
deviation playing xk + δ (resp. xk − δ) for a small enough δ. His payoff is equal to a right
trapezoid’s area (see figure 2 below):
pk(x1, . . . , xn) = (xk,k+1 − xk−1,k)
(
1 + ǫ
xk,k+1 + xk−1,k
2
)
| | | | |
1 + ǫxk−1,k
1 + ǫxk,k+1
xk−1 xk−1,k xk xk,k+1 xk+1
Figure 2: Domain of attraction and payoff of player k in xk
For a small enough δ > 0, we have that:
pk(x1, . . . , xk−1, xk+δ, xk+1, . . . , xn) = (xk,k+1−xk−1,k)
(
1 + ǫ
xk,k+1 + xk−1,k
2
+ ǫδ
)
> pk(x1, . . . , xn)
The last inequality is in contradiction with (x1, . . . , xn) being an equilibrium. We there-
fore proved that if (x1, . . . , xn) is an equilibrium, then all players are coupled.
We now suppose that all players are coupled x1 = x2, x3 = x4, . . . ,, xn−1 = xn,
and will find a contradiction. We denote A1 :=
∫ x1
0 f(x)dx, A2 :=
∫ x2,3
x1
f(x)dx,. . . ,
A2k−1 =
∫ x2k−1
x2k−2,2k−1
f(x)dx, A2k =
∫ x2k,2k+1
x2k
f(x)dx, . . . , An :=
∫ 1
xn
f(x)dx. We now prove
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A2 = A3 and that it implies a contradiction.
We have p1(x) = p2(x) =
A1+A2
2 . If A1 > A2 (resp. A2 > A1) then player 1 could
deviate to x1 − δ (resp. x1 + δ) and get a payoff arbitrary close to A1 (resp. A2) ≥
A1+A2
2 .
The equilibrium condition gives A1 = A2 = p1(x). But A1 < A3 is forbidden, otherwise
player 1 could deviate to x3−δ and have a payoff arbitrary close to A3. A similar argument
forbids A3 < A1. We therefore have A1 = A2 = A3. But A2 = A3 is not possible because
these two quantities are defined as integral of a strictly increasing function on two intervals
of the same length. Therefore there is no equilibrium in the game H (n, [0, 1], f) with
f(x) = 1 + ǫx and with n > 2.
In the next example, we focus on the case of 4 players in the unit interval where it
is known that there exist a unique (up to permutations of the players) Nash equilibrium
when the consumers are uniformly distributed. This equilibrium is such that two players
choose 14 and two players choose
3
4 . We prove that with a very large class of distribution of
consumers, pure Nash equilibrium may not exist. It illustrates that the previous example
does not rely on the choice of a particular density function. Proposition 6 is also a good
illustration of the following: if (x1, . . . , xn) is an exact equilibrium in the uniform case, then
the profile (y1, . . . , yn) where yk is the xk-quantile of f , is not in general an equilibrium in
the case where consumers are distributed according to the density f . The reason is that
consumers, as opposed to players, do not care about the density f , they just shop at the
closest location with respect to the distance d.
Proposition 6. Consider H (4, [0, 1], f) the Hotelling game with 4 players on the unit
interval [0, 1] and with a density function f . We denote q1, q2 and q3 the quartiles of the
distribution f , i.e.
∫ q1
0 f(x)dx =
∫ q2
q1
f(x)dx =
∫ q3
q2
f(x)dx =
∫ 1
q3
f(x)dx = 14 . The only
possible equilibrium is the configuration where two players select q1 and two players select
q3, but this configuration is an equilibrium if and only if q2 =
q1+q3
2 .
Proof. Denote x1, x2, x3, x4 the locations chosen by the players, and suppose without loss
of generality, that x1 ≤ x2 ≤ x3 ≤ x4. First, if (x1, x2, x3, x4) is an equilibrium then
x1 = x2 and x3 = x4, otherwise player 1 (resp. 4) would have a profitable deviation by
playing x1+x22 (resp.
x3+x4
2 ). Moreover, if (x1, x2, x3, x4) is an equilibrium, the quantities
A :=
∫ x1
0 f(x)dx, B :=
∫ x1+x3
2
x1
f(x)dx, C :=
∫ x3
x1+x3
2
f(x)dx and D :=
∫ 1
x3
f(x)dx have to be
equal. Indeed the payoffs of players 1 and 2 are A+B2 , and the payoff of players 3 and 4 are
C+D
2 . Any player can have a payoff arbitrary close to A,B,C or D by playing, respectively
x1 − ǫ, x1 + ǫ, x3 − ǫ or x3 + ǫ with ǫ small enough. This consideration leads to the fact
that A = B = C = D, and therefore x1 = x2 = q1,
x1+x3
2 = q2 and x3 = x4 = q3. It is then
necessary that q2 =
q1+q3
2 and in this case, the profile x1 = x2 = q1 and x3 = x4 = q3 is
clearly an equilibrium.
In the next example, we show that when the number of players is small, there may not
exist any ǫ-equilibrium for arbitrary small ǫ.
Proposition 7. For any ǫ < 114 , there is no ǫ-equilibrium (additive or multiplicative) in
H (3, [0, 1], f).
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Proof. We prove it for additive ǫ-equilibrium first, and prove that it implies the non exis-
tence of multiplicative ǫ-equilibrium.
We can admit without loss of generality that
∫ 1
0 f(x)dx = 1. Suppose first that
x1 < x2 < x3. Using the notation xi,i+1 :=
xi+xi+1
2 , we have that
∫ x2
x1,2
f(x)dx ≤ 114 and∫ x2,3
x2
f(x)dx ≤ 114 , otherwise player 1 (resp. 3) would deviate to x2 − δ (resp. x2 + δ) and
improve his payoff by more than 114 , for arbitrary small δ. It follows that p2(x1, x2, x3) ≤
1
7
and:
∫ x1
0
f(x)dx+
∫ x1,2
x1
f(x)dx+
∫ x3
x2,3
f(x)dx+
∫ 1
x3
f(x)dx = 1−
∫ x2
x1,2
f(x)dx−
∫ x2,3
x2
f(x)dx ≥
6
7
We conclude that at least one of these four terms is larger than 314 . Player 2 can have a
payoff arbitrary close to any of these quantity by playing respectively x1− δ, x1+ δ ,x3− δ
or x3 + δ with a small enough δ. It leads to a contradiction because
3
14 −
1
7 =
1
14 > ǫ.
Suppose now that x1 = x2 = x3, then p1 = p2 = p3 =
1
3 , but player 1 can get a payoff
at least arbitrary close to 12 by playing either x1 − δ or x1 + δ for a small enough δ. We
have a contradiction because 12 −
1
3 =
1
6 >
1
14 > ǫ.
Suppose finally that x1 = x2 < x3. The same argument used in the first case gives that∫ x2,3
x1
f(x)dx ≤ 114 . It is also necessary that
∫ x1
0 f(x)dx ≤
∫ x2,3
x1
f(x)dx+ 114 otherwise player 1
would deviate to x1+δ for a small enough δ. Therefore
∫ 1
x2,3
f(x)dx = 1−
∫ x2,3
0 f(x)dx ≥
11
14 .
It results that either
∫ x3
x2,3
f(x)dx ≥ 1128 or
∫ 1
x3
f(x)dx ≥ 1128 . Player 1 can have a payoff ar-
bitrary close to these quantities by playing x3 − δ or x3 + δ for small enough δ. But
p1(x1, x2, x3) =
∫ x2,3
0
f(x)dx
2 ≤
3
14 , so he can improve his payoff by
11
28 −
3
14 =
5
28 >
1
14 > ǫ. In
any case, there is no additive 114 -equilibrium.
We can also prove that there is no multiplicative ǫ-equilibrium. Suppose that there
exists one x. If xdev is a profile of location obtained after a possible unilateral deviation
from x, we have for any k ∈ {1, 2, 3} that pk(xdev) ≤ (1 + ǫ)pk(x). Because the payoff of
any player is bounded by 1 we have:
pk(xdev)− pk(x) ≤ ǫpk(x) ≤ ǫ
We have a contradiction because x can not be an additive ǫ-equilibrium.
5 Proof of theorem 2
In the current section we give a proof for Theorem 2. As announced the sketch of the proof
in section 3, the extensive proof is divided in 3 steps detailed in subsections 5.1, 5.2 and
5.3.
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5.1 The approximation of the density by step functions
In this subsection, we construct a step function g(ǫ1) for a fixed parameter ǫ1, and we prove
that g(ǫ1) is a good approximation of f when ǫ1 is small.
Definition 8. For a fixed ǫ1 > 0, the step function g(ǫ1) : G→ R
+ is defined edge by edge
as follows. On an edge e ∈ E, the number of step is equal to Ie :=
⌈
λeK
2ǫ1
⌉
, and all steps are
semi open intervals5of the same length:
ℓ(ǫ1) :=
λe⌈
λeK
2ǫ1
⌉ (3)
It is clear that λe
ℓe(ǫ1)
= Ie ∈ N. The function g(ǫ1) is constant on a step, and its common
value is equal to the value of f at the middle point of the step. More precisely, if we denote
ge(ǫ1) and fe is the restrictions of g(ǫ1) and f on the edge e and if we use the natural
identification between an edge e and the real interval [0, λe],
6we have that:

First step: (i = 0) ∀x ∈ [0, ℓe(ǫ1)), ge(x) = fe(
ℓe(ǫ1)
2 )
...
ithstep: ∀x ∈ [iℓe(ǫ1), (i+ 1)ℓe(ǫ1)), ge(x) = fe((i+
1
2)ℓe(ǫ1))
...
Last step: (i = Ie − 1) ∀x ∈ [λe − ℓe(ǫ1), λe), ge(x) = fe(λe −
ℓe(ǫ1)
2 )
The next lemma shows that g(ǫ1) is a good approximation of f when ǫ1 is small enough.
Lemma 9. ||f − g(ǫ1)||∞ ≤ ǫ1
Proof. Let x ∈ G. Let e, i such that x ∈ e and x ∈ [iℓe(ǫ1), (i + 1)ℓe(ǫ1)[. Using the
definition of g(ǫ1) and the fact that f is K-Lipschitz, we have:
|f(x)− g(x)| ≤|fe(x)− fe((i +
1
2
)iℓe(ǫ1))|+ |fe((i+
1
2
)iℓe(ǫ1))− ge(x)|
≤K|x− (i+
1
2
)ℓe(ǫ1)|+ 0
≤K
ℓe(ǫ1)
2
= K
λe
2
⌈
λeK
2ǫ1
⌉ ≤ ǫ1
The payoff function in the game H (n, S, f) is defined in equation (2). In subsection
5.2 we study the game H (n, S, g(ǫ1)) where the consumers are distributed according to the
density g(ǫ1). The payoff function in this game is denote π and is now formally defined.
5However, because we only consider consumers’ distributions absolutely continuous with respect to the
Lebesgue measure, the definition of g on a singleton is not relevant.
6We use also the arbitrary orientation on the edges. The choice of this orientation does not play any role.
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Definition 10. We define the payoff function π := (π1, . . . , πn) in the game H (n, S, g(ǫ1)).
For a given profile of action x, we have that:
πi(x) :=
1
Card({j ∈ {1, . . . , n} : xj = xi})
∑
A⊂{x1,...,xn}|xi∈A
µ˜(DA)
Card(A)
. (4)
where DA is defined in equation (1) and where µ˜(DA) =
∫
DA
g(ǫ1)(x)dL (x).
5.2 The equilibrium with the step function density g(ǫ1)
In this subsection, we provide a method to construct an (exact) equilibrium in the game
with density function g(ǫ1) and with a large enough number of players.
In subsection 5.2.1 we describe a profile of location x(θ, ǫ1) for some fixed real numbers
θ > 0 and ǫ1 > 0. Lemma 11 below is useful to compute the number h(θ, ǫ1) of players in
such a configuration. In subsection 5.2.2, we prove that x(θ, ǫ1) is an exact equilibrium in
the game H (h(θ, ǫ1), S, g(ǫ1)). Before describing the profile x(θ, ǫ1) we emphasize on its
differences with existing constructions.
The method used to construct the auxiliary equilibrium in 5.2.1 is inspired by the ones
used in Pa´lvo¨lgyi [2011] and Fournier and Scarsini [2014]. Nevertheless, the main difference
is that we provide here a construction that depends on the steps of the function g(ǫ1), as
opposed to the mentioned constructions that describe edge-dependent models. The current
construction depends on two parameters θ and ǫ1, and the lengths of the intervals between
players depend on the value of the function g(ǫ1). Note that in the papers mentioned above,
it is not trivial to add ”fake” vertices of degree 2 and to consider the steps of g as artificial
edges between such vertices. The existing constructions depends strongly on the number
of vertices, and vertices of degree 2 are not taken into account: in particular it is not a
necessary condition that for a large number of players, at least one player chose to play in
a vertex with degree 2, as opposed to vertices with degree at least 3.
5.2.1 Description of the profile x(θ, ǫ1)
We now describe the profile x(θ, ǫ1) for fixed parameters θ > 0 and ǫ1 > 0. In the definition
of the function g(ǫ1) in subsection 5.1, we divide each edge e ∈ E into Ie steps, on which
g(ǫ1) is constant. It is important that every edge contains at least two steps, therefore in
the sequel of the paper we always suppose ǫ1 <
minλeK
2 . We distinguish 3 different types
of steps: the steps adjacent to a leaf, i.e. a vertex with degree 1, the steps adjacent to a
vertex of degree at least 3,7 and the remaining steps, that we call interior steps. Steps of
the same type have the same players’ positioning, that we now descibe.
1/ We first consider an interior step, that is not at an extremity of the edge. Denote e
the edge such that this step belongs to e and i ∈ {1, . . . , Ie − 2} such that the step
7Remember we can assume without loss of generality that all vertices have degree different from 2, as
explained in subsection 2.1.
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belongs to the i-th step of the edge e (i.e. it can be identified with the real interval
[iℓe(ǫ1), (i + 1)ℓe(ǫ1)]). The value of g on this step is g
i
e(ǫ1) = fe((i +
1
2 )ℓe(ǫ1)). For
simplicity, we denote it gie.
There are a total of
⌈
gieℓe(ǫ1)
2θ
⌉
players in the interior of the edge and two players on
each extremity of the step. At a distance 2θ
gie
from one of the boundary there are
two players. All the other players are single, at distance a
i
eθ
gie
from each other and at
distance 2θ
gie
from the coupled players, where aie is equal to:
aie =
gieℓe(ǫ1)
θ
− 6⌈
gieℓe(ǫ1)
2θ
⌉
− 3
(5)
|
2
|
2
|
1
|
1
|
1
|
1
|
2... ...
2θ
gie
2θ
gie
aieθ
gie
aieθ
gie
2θ
gie
Figure 3: Players on a step of type 1 (interior step).
The previous description is compatible with the fact that the total length of the step
is ℓe(ǫ1), because the parameter a
i
e is such that the following equation holds:
ℓe(ǫ) =
6θ
gie
+
aieθ
gie
× (
⌈
gieℓe(ǫ1)
2θ
⌉
− 3)
2/ We consider now a step connected to a vertex v with degree at least 3. There are⌈
gieℓe(ǫ1)
2θ
⌉
players in the interior of this edge, plus deg(v) players in the vertex v and
two players on the other extremity. There are 2 players at a distance 2θ
gie
from v. All
the other players are single, at distance a
i
eθ
gie
from each other and at distance 2θ
gie
from
coupled players, where aie was defined in equation (5).
|
deg(v)
|
2
|
1
|
1 ... ...
|
1
|
1
|
2
2θ
gie
2θ
gie
aieθ
gie
aieθ
gie
2θ
gie
Figure 4: Players on a step of type 2 (connected to a vertex v).
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The previous description is also compatible with the fact that the total length of the
step is ℓe(ǫ1), because the parameter a
i
e is such that the following equation holds:
ℓe(ǫ) =
6θ
gie
+
aieθ
gie
× (
⌈
gieℓeǫ1)
2θ
⌉
− 3)
3/ We now consider a step connected to a leaf. In the interior of the step there are⌈
gieℓe(ǫ1)
2θ
⌉
+ 2 players and one player is located at the extremity opposed to the the
leaf. Two players are at distance θ
gie
and two players are at distance 3θ
gie
. The other
players are single at distance b
i
eθ
gie
from each other, where:
bie =
gieℓe(ǫ1)
θ
− 7⌈
gieℓe(ǫ1)
2θ
⌉
− 3
(6)
| || | | | |
2 1 1 ... ... 1 1 2 2
2θ
gie
bieθ
gie
bieθ
gie
2θ
gie
2θ
gie
θ
gie
Figure 5: Players in a step of type 3 (connected to a leaf).
The previous description is, once again, compatible with the fact that the total length
of the step is ℓe(ǫ1), because the parameter b
i
e is such that the following equation holds:
ℓe(ǫ) =
7θ
gie
+
bieθ
gie
× (
⌈
gieℓe(ǫ1)
2θ
⌉
− 3)
We described the players’ positioning on all the different types of steps. We now compute
how many players are located on the graph in the described profile, with respect to the
parameters θ and ǫ1.
Lemma 11. The total number of players in the profile x(θ, ǫ1) is:
h(θ, ǫ1) :=
∑
e∈E
Ie−1∑
i=0
⌈
gie(ǫ1)ℓe(ǫ1)
2θ
⌉
+ 2Card(EL) + 2
∑
e∈E
⌈
λeK
2ǫ1
⌉
where EL denotes the set of edges (u, v) with deg(u) = 1 or deg(v) = 1.
Proof. We denote gie instead of g
i
e(ǫ1). In the interior of every step that is not connected to
a leaf (types 1 and 2) there are
⌈
gieℓe(ǫ1)
2θ
⌉
players. In the interior of every step connected to
a leaft (type 3) there are
⌈
gieℓe(ǫ1)
2θ
⌉
+2 players and there are Card(EL) such steps. Because
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the number of steps in an edge e is Ie, there are in total a number of players in the interior
of steps equal to: ∑
e∈E
Ie−1∑
i=0
⌈
gieℓe(ǫ1)
2θ
⌉
+ 2Card(EL)
Moreover, in the intersection of two steps in the same edge there are 2 player. In the
edge e, there are λe
ℓe(ǫ2)
steps, and then λe
ℓe(ǫ2)
− 1 such intersections. In a vertex v there are
deg(v) players. Using that
∑
v∈V deg(v) = 2Card(E) and the definition of ℓe(ǫ1), we have
that the total number of players located at the intersections between steps is equal to:
2Card(E) + 2
∑
e∈E
(
λe
ℓe(ǫ2)
− 1
)
= 2
∑
e∈E
λe
ℓe(ǫ2)
= 2
∑
e∈E
⌈
λeK
2ǫ1
⌉
The sum of these two quantities is equal to the announced h(θ, ǫ1).
5.2.2 The profile x(θ, ǫ1) is an equilibrium in H (h(θ, ǫ1), S, g(ǫ1))
In 5.2.1 we described the profile x(θ, ǫ1) for fixed parameters θ > 0 and ǫ1 ∈ (0,
minλeK
2 )
and proved that it contains h(θ, ǫ1) players. We now prove that it is an (exact) equilibrium
in the game H (h(θ, ǫ1), S, g(ǫ1)).
Proposition 12. For any ǫ1 ∈ (0,
minλeK
2 ), if the number of player n is larger than
Ω(ǫ1) := 5Card(E) +
⌈
5L(M + ǫ1)
(m− ǫ1)
(
K
2ǫ1
+
1
minλe
)
+
3LK
2ǫ1
⌉
(7)
then there is a pure Nash equilibrium in H (n, S, g(ǫ1)).
In the proof of Proposition 12, we construct a pure Nash equilibrium that is a variation
of the profile x(θ, ǫ1), for a good parameter θ. Before proving Proposition 12, we state and
prove two useful lemma.
Lemma 13. Let ǫ1 ∈ (0,
minλeK
2 ) and suppose that the parameter θ satisfies θ ≤
gie(ǫ1)ℓ(ǫ1)
10
for all e ∈ E and all i ∈ {0, Ie − 1}. Then the profile x(θ, ǫ1) is such that we have the
following statements:
• Claim 1: For all e ∈ E and all i ∈ {0, Ie − 1} we have that 1 ≤ a
i
e ≤ 2 and that
1 ≤ bie ≤ 2.
• Claim 2: Every player that shares its location with at least one other player has a
payoff equal to θ.
• Claim 3: The payoff of every player is at least θ and at most 2θ.
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• Claim 4: Because there are players located in every vertex, the part of the network
between two neighbors’ locations is always a segment, that can be identified with a real
interval. No such interval contains a larger quantity of consumers than 2θ.
Proof. Proof of Claim 1: Let e ∈ E and i ∈ {0, Ie − 1}. Remember that a
i
e and b
i
e are
defined as:
aie =
gieℓe(ǫ1)
θ
− 6⌈
gieℓe(ǫ1)
2θ
⌉
− 3
bie =
gieℓe(ǫ1)
θ
− 7⌈
gieℓe(ǫ1)
2θ
⌉
− 3
We obviously have bie < a
i
e. First remark that:
gieℓe(ǫ1)
θ
− 6 = 2
gieℓe(ǫ1)
2θ
− 6 ≤ 2
⌈
gieℓe(ǫ1)
2θ
⌉
− 6 = 2(
⌈
gieℓ(ǫ1)
2θ
⌉
− 3)
And it follows that aie ≤ 2. Moreover, because θ ≤
gieℓe(ǫ1)
10 , we have that 5 ≤
gieℓe(ǫ1)
2θ . It
implies that the second inequality below:⌈
gieℓe(ǫ1)
2θ
⌉
− 3 ≤
gieℓe(ǫ1)
2θ
− 2 ≤
gieℓe(ǫ1)
θ
− 7
And it follows that 1 ≤ bie.
Proof of Claim 2: It follows from the definition of x(θ, ǫ1) that when k ≥ 2 players are in
the same location their payoffs are equal to 1
k
times the sum of k terms, each equal to θ
gei
×gie
for a given e ∈ E and a given i ∈ {1, . . . , Ie − 1} (on each direction, the location attracts
an interval of consumers of length θ
gei
, and the density of consumer is equal to gie).
Proof of Claim 3: Using Claim 2, we just have to prove it for single players. Depending
on the type of the step this player belongs to and his position on the step, his payoff
can be equal to a
i
eθ
gie
× gie or to
aieθ
2gie
× gie +
2θ
2gie
× gie (in type 1 or 2) or to
bieθ
gie
× gie or to
bieθ
2gie
× gie +
2θ
2gie
× gie (type 3), for some e ∈ E and i, i
′ ∈ {1, . . . , Ie − 1}. Using Claim 1, we
have that 1 ≤ bie < a
i
e ≤ 2, and it results that his payoff belongs to [θ, 2θ].
Proof of Claim 4: This claim is obvious since the largest length of such an interval is 2θ
gie
and
the density is gie, for some e ∈ E and i ∈ {1, . . . , Ie − 1}.
Lemma 13 is the toolbox to prove the next lemma.
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Lemma 14. Suppose that ǫ1 ∈ (0,
minλeK
2 ) and that the parameter θ satisfies θ ≤
gie(ǫ1)ℓ(ǫ1)
10
for all e ∈ E and all i ∈ {0, Ie − 1}. Then the profile x(θ, ǫ1) is an equilibrium of
H (h(θ, ǫ1), S, g(ǫ1)).
Proof. We will make an intensive use of Lemma 13, that applies because θ ≤ g
i
e(ǫ1)ℓ(ǫ1)
10 .
Lemma 11 states that x(θ, ǫ1) involves h(θ, ǫ1) players so it is a possible profile of actions
in this game. For simplicity, we denote during this proof m := h(θ, ǫ1), g
i
e instead of g
i
e(ǫ1)
and x or (x1, . . . , xm) the profile x(θ, ǫ1). We now conclude that x is an equilibrium of
H (m,S, g(ǫ1)). Consider any player k in the profile x and denote xk his location. We
study all possible deviations and conclude that none of them are profitable.
Case 1: Suppose first that the player k shares his position with at least one other player
in the profile x. This is the most simple case: the domain of attraction of xk does not
change after the deviation of player k, because there is still at least one player left in xk.
Notice that because there is no tie on set with strictly positive measure in x, the domain of
attraction of y is the set of consumers that shop at location y. Claim 1 of Lemma 13 assures
that pk(x), the payoff of player k, is equal to θ. We now consider his possible unilateral
deviation to a location y ∈ G.
Case 1-a: If player k deviates to a location xj that was chosen by exactly one player j
in the profile x, we have:
πk(x1, . . . , xk−1, xj , xk+1, . . . , xm) =
πj(x)
2
≤
2θ
2
= πk(x)
where the inequality comes from Claim 3 in 13. Such a deviation is not profitable.
Case 1-b: Suppose that player k deviates to a location y that was chosen by at least
two players in the profile x. Using Claim 2 in 13 and the fact that players in y now have
to share the domain of attraction with one more player, we have that:
πk(x1, . . . , xk−1, y, xk+1, . . . , xm) < θ = πk(x)
The deviation is not profitable.
Case 1-c: Suppose finally that player k deviates in a location y that belongs to an
interval [xj , xj′ ] between two neighbors xj and xj′ . It follows from the definition of x that
the density g(ǫ1) is constant on this interval. Therefore, by deviating to y ∈ [xj , xj′ ] player
k attracts half the consumers located in [xj, xj′ ]. Using Claim 4 in Lemma 13 we have that:
πk(x1, . . . , xk−1, y, xk+1, . . . , xm) ≤
2θ
2
= πk(x)
And we proved that there is no profitable deviation for such a player.
Case 2: Suppose now that the player k doesn’t share his location with another player in
the profile x. Claim 1 of Lemma 13 states that his payoff pk(x) is at least θ. This second
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case is a bit more delicate because when the player k deviates, it changes the domain of at-
traction of his neighbors. Without loss of generality we denote xk−1 and xk+1 the neighbors’
location of xk ( a location with a single player always have left and right neighbor in x).
We denote pk(x) :=
(xk+1−xk−1)g
i
e
2 his payoff. If the player k deviates to a location that does
not belongs to the interval [xk−1, xk+1] the situation is similar to the one considered in case 1.
Case 2-a: Suppose first that the player k deviates to a location y in the interior of the
interval [xk−1, xk+1]. It follows from the definition of x that the density g(ǫ1) is constant
on this interval. After such a deviation his payoff would still be equal to
(xk+1−xk−1)g
i
e
2 .
Case 2-b: Suppose now that the player k deviates to the location of one of his neighbors.
Several sub-cases have to be considered. Suppose first that player k is at distance 4θ
gie
from
the left extremity of a step of type 1 or 2, see figure 3 or 4. His payoff in this case satisfies:
πk(x) =
(
θ
gie
+
aieθ
2gie
)
gie = θ +
aieθ
2
If such a player k deviates to his right neighbor’s location y (i.e. at distance 4θ
gie
+ a
i
eθ
gie
from the left extremity), his payoff after deviation would satisfy:
πk(x1, . . . , xk−1, y, xk+1, . . . , xm) =
2θ+aieθ
2gie
+ a
i
eθ
2gie
2
gie =
θ + aieθ
2
≤ πk(x)
Such a deviation is not profitable. If player k deviates to his left neighbor’s location y
(i.e. at distance 2θ
gie
from the left extremity), his payoff after deviation would satisfy:
πk(x1, . . . , xk−1, y, xk+1, . . . , xm) =
θ
gie
+ θ
gie
+ a
i
eθ
2gie
3
gie =
2θ
3
+
aieθ
6
< πk(x)
Such a deviation is not profitable. The two previous arguments are also valid when we
consider the player at distance 5θ
gie
from the right extremity of a step of type 3 (see figure 5).
The last sub-case we have to consider is the case of a single player that is in a location
at distance a
i
eθ
gie
(resp. b
i
eθ
gie
) from his two neighbors, in an edge of type 1 or 2 (resp. 3).
His payoff pk(x) is equal to
aieθ
gie
gie = a
i
eθ (resp. b
i
eθ). If he deviates to one of his neighbor
location that is also a player at distance a
i
eθ
gie
(resp. b
i
eθ
gie
) from his two neighbors, the payoff
after deviation would satisfy:
πk(x1, . . . , xk−1, y, xk+1, . . . , xm) =
3aieθ
2gie
gie
2
≤
3
4
πk(x)
(resp.
3bieθ
2gie
gie
2 ≤
3
4πk(x)) Such a deviation is not profitable. If he deviates to his neighbor
location that is at distance a
i
eθ
gie
(resp. b
i
eθ
gie
) from one neighbor and at distance 2θ
gie
from his
other neighbor, the payoff after deviation would satisfy:
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πk(x1, . . . , xk−1, y, xk+1, . . . , xm) =
2aieθ + 2θ
4
=
aieθ
2
+
θ
2
≤ πk(x)
(resp. 2b
i
eθ+2θ
4 =
bieθ
2 +
θ
2 ≤ πk(x) Such a deviation is not profitable. All possible
cases were analyzed, and it follows that there is no possible deviation from x, which is an
equilibrium in H (m,S, g(ǫ1)).
We are now ready to prove Proposition 12 by modifying the profile x(θ, ǫ1) with an
adequate θ.
Proof. of Proposition 12.
This is a two steps proof. First we show that for a given θ ∈ R, the profile x(θ, ǫ1) is a
pure Nash equilibrium in the game H (n′, S, g(ǫ1)) with a number of players n
′ such that
n ≤ n′ ≤ n +
∑
e Ie. Second, we prove that from this equilibrium profile, we can derive
another profile of location xˆ(ǫ1) that is an equilibrium in H (n, S, g(ǫ1)). Indeed, in the
profile x(θ, ǫ1) there are at least
∑
e Ie players that are unnecessary: the same configuration
without them is an equilibrium in the game with less players. We can therefore obtain
an equilibrium in the game H (n, S, g(ǫ1)) with exactly n players. A similar technic of
going thought an auxiliary equilibrium with extra unnecessary players was already used in
[Fournier and Scarsini, 2014].
First step: The function that maps θ ∈ R+ to h(θ, ǫ1) ∈ N is not necessarily onto.
Nevertheless it is a sum of a constant and
∑
e∈E Ie terms of the form
⌈
c
θ
⌉
with a constant
c. Each term of this form is decreasing, right continuous and has jumps of amplitude 1, i.e.
for every θ:
lim
θ→a
⌈ c
θ
⌉
−
⌈ c
a
⌉
≤ 1
Moreover, we have that:
limθ→0 h(θ, ǫ1) = +∞
limθ→+∞ h(θ, ǫ1) =Card(EL) +
∑
e∈E
Ie + 2
∑
e∈E
⌈
λeK
2ǫ1
⌉
Therefore, because the function θ 7→ h(θ, ǫ1) is right continuous, for any n ≥ Card(EL)+∑
e∈E Ie + 2
∑
e∈E
⌈
λeK
2ǫ1
⌉
8 there exists a unique θ which is the minimal solution to:
n ≤ h(θ, ǫ1) ≤ n+
∑
e∈E
Ie (8)
We now show that x(θ, ǫ1) is an equilibrium with n
′ := h(θ, ǫ1) players. Suppose that
n ≥ Ω(ǫ1), where Ω(ǫ1) is defined in equation (7), then for all e ∈ E and all i ∈ {0, . . . , Ie−1},
we have that:
8Remark that Card(EL) +
∑
e∈E Ie + 2
∑
e∈E
⌈
λeK
2ǫ1
⌉
≤ Ω(ǫ1) so this constrain vanishes when we ask n
to be larger than N(ǫ1)
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h(θ¯, ǫ1) ≥ n ≥ Ω(ǫ1) ≥ h(
ℓeg
i
e
10
, ǫ1)
where first inequality comes equation (8) and last inequality is proved in Lemma 17 in
Annex and only requires computation. Because the function θ → h(θ, ǫ1) is decreasing it
results that for all e and i:
θ ≤
ℓeg
i
e
10
Therefore, Lemma 14 applies and proves that the profile x(θ, ǫ1) is an equilibrium in
the game H (n′, S, g(ǫ1)) with n
′ players, where n′ ∈ [n, n+
∑
e∈E Ie].
Second step: We now provide a method to construct a profile xˆ(ǫ1) with exactly n
players and that is an equilibrium in H (n, S, g(ǫ1)). On the profile x(θ, ǫ1) with n
′ players,
we have at most
∑
e Ie too many players. This quantity is equal to the total number of steps
on which g(ǫ1) is constant. This is also the number of different steps in the construction
of x(θ, ǫ1). On each step, there are 2 players in the same location, at distance
2θ
gie
from
their neighbors in both directions. We claim that one of these players is not necessary: it
means that the same configuration without this player is still an equilibrium in the game
H (n′ − 1, S, g(ǫ1)). Indeed, in the new configuration, only the payoff of the player who
shared his location with the removed player has changed. This payoff has increasing and is
now equal to 2θ. A deviation to this location would give any player a payoff of θ, which is
not profitable. It results that there is no profitable deviation and the new profile of location
is an equilibrium in the game H (n′−1, S, g(ǫ1)). We can reiterate this argument with up to
one player on each step, so in total with up to
∑
e Ie players in the graph. We can therefore
get an equilibrium in the game H (n, S, g(ǫ1)) and this equilibrium is denoted xˆ(ǫ1).
5.3 ǫ-equilibrium in the general game
In subsection 5.2 we constructed the profile xˆ(ǫ1) and proved that it is an (exact) equilibrium
in H (n, S, g(ǫ1)), provided that the number of players n satisfies n ≥ Ω(ǫ1). In the current
subsection, we prove that for any ǫ > 0 the profile xˆ(ǫ1) is moreover an ǫ-equilibrium in
H (n, S, f) in the case where ǫ1 is smaller than a given upper bound and where the number
of players n continues to satisfy n ≥ Ω(ǫ1).
Remember that the functions p = (pk)1≤k≤n and π = (πk)1≤k≤n are defined in equations
(2) and (4) as the payoff functions in the games H (n, S, f) and H (n, S, g(ǫ1)), respectively.
In the next lemma, the first claim expresses how close are the payoffs of the players when
they play the profile xˆ(ǫ1) in H (n, S, g(ǫ1)) or in H (n, S, f).
The second claim concerns a possible profile xdev with n players after a deviation of a
single player from xˆ(ǫ1). In other words if xˆ(ǫ1) = (x1, . . . , xn) then:
xdev = (x1, . . . , xk−1, y, xk+1, . . . , xn) (9)
for a given player k and a given location y ∈ G.
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Lemma 15. For any ǫ1 ∈ (0,
minλeK
2 ), if n ≥ Ω(ǫ1) then:
• Claim 1: xˆ(ǫ1) is such that for any player k in {1, . . . , n}:
|pk(xˆ(ǫ1))− πk(xˆ(ǫ1))| ≤
4ǫ1θ
m− ǫ1
where θ is defined in equation (8).
• Claim 2: the profile xdev defined in equation (9) is such that for any deviating player
k ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have:
|pk(xdev)− πk(xdev)| ≤
8ǫ1θ
m− ǫ1
Proof. Proof of Claim 1: It follows from the definitions of p and π that:
|pk(xˆ(ǫ1))−πk(xˆ(ǫ1))| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
Card({j ∈ {1, . . . , n} : xj = xk})
∑
A⊂{x1,...,xn}
xk∈A
∫
DA
(g(ǫ1)(x) − f(x))dL (x)
Card(A)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
whereDA was defined in equation (1). If we use the convention that deg(xk) = 2 if xk ∈ G\V
then the profile xˆ(ǫ1) is such that the number of players located in xk ∈ G is either 0 or at
least deg(xk)− 1 > 0. Using this property and the fact that ‖f − g(ǫ1)‖∞ ≤ ǫ1 (as proved
in Lemma 9), we have that:
|pk(xˆ(ǫ1))− πk(xˆ(ǫ1))| ≤
1
deg(xk)− 1
∑
A⊂{x1,...,xn}|xk∈A
L (DA)ǫ1
Card(A)
The profile xˆ(ǫ1) also has the property that at least one player is located in every vertex.
It implies that ties only occur between players in the same location.9 Therefore the sum∑
A⊂{x1,...,xn}
xk∈A
is reduced to a single term, where A = {xk}. It follows:
|pk(xˆ(ǫ1))− πk(xˆ(ǫ1))| ≤
1
deg(xk)− 1
L (D{xk})ǫ1
It follows from the definition of xˆ(ǫ1) that the domain of attraction of the location {xk}
is a union of deg(xk) intervals, and that such an interval has a length bounded by
2θ
gie
for a
given e ∈ E and a given i ∈ {0, Ie − 1}. It results:
|pk(xˆ(ǫ1))− πk(xˆ(ǫ1))| ≤
deg(xk)
deg(xk)− 1
2θ
gie
ǫ1
Because deg(xk) ≥ 2 and g(ǫ1) ≥ m− ǫ1, we proved that:
9We consider here only ties on a set with a strictly positive measure.
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|pk(xˆ(ǫ1))− πk(xˆ(ǫ1))| ≤
4ǫ1θ
m− ǫ1
Proof of claim 2: Suppose first that the player k deviates to a new location y that is not
a leaf (i.e. a vertex with degree 1). Using the same arguments detailed in the beginning of
the proof of Claim 1 applied to xdev, we obtain:
|pk(xdev)− πk(xdev)| ≤
1
deg(y) − 1
L (D{xk})ǫ1
It follows from the definition of xˆ(ǫ1) that, even after a unilateral deviation, the domain
of attraction of the location y is a union of deg(y) intervals. Such an interval has a length
at most twice as large as an interval in xˆ(ǫ1), i.e. a it has a length bounded above by
4θ
gie
for a given e ∈ E and a given i ∈ {0, Ie − 1}. We get therefore:
|pk(xˆ(ǫ1))− πk(xˆ(ǫ1))| ≤
deg(xk)
deg(xk)− 1
4θ
gie
ǫ1
Because deg(xk) ≥ 2 and g(ǫ1) ≥ m− ǫ1, we proved that:
|pk(xˆ(ǫ1))− πk(xˆ(ǫ1))| ≤
8ǫ1θ
m− ǫ1
If player k deviates to a leaf y, then Card({j ∈ {1, . . . , n} : xj = y}) = 1 and its domain
of attraction is a unique interval. We obtain |pk(xdev)− πk(xdev)| ≤
4ǫ1θ
m−ǫ1
≤ 8ǫ1θ
m−ǫ1
Proposition 16. If n ≥ Ω(ǫ1) then xˆ(ǫ1) is both an additive Ψ[ǫ1]-equilibrium, and a
multiplicative Φ[ǫ1]-equilibrium in H (n, S, f), i.e. for any xk ∈ G:
pk(xdev) ≤ pk(xˆ(ǫ1)) + Ψ(ǫ1)
and
pk(xdev) ≤ (1 + Φ(ǫ1))pk(xˆ(ǫ1))
where Ψ(ǫ1) :=
5ǫ2
1
(M+ǫ1)
12K(m−ǫ1)
and Φ(ǫ1) :=
12ǫ1
m−ǫ1
.
Proof. We have that:
pk(xdev)− pk(xˆ(ǫ1)) = pk(xdev)− πk(xdev)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+πk(xdev)− πk(xˆ(ǫ1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
+πk(xˆ(ǫ1))− pk(xˆ(ǫ1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
Because xˆ(ǫ1) is an equilibrium in H (n, S, g(ǫ1)), we have that B ≤ 0. Lemma 15
proves that C ≤ 4ǫ1θ
m−ǫ1
and A ≤ 8ǫ1θ
m−ǫ1
, we have therefore:
pk(xdev)− pk(xˆ(ǫ1)) ≤
12ǫ1θ
m− ǫ1
(10)
We now use the fact that n ≥ Ω(ǫ1) implies θ ≤
ǫ1(M+ǫ1)
5K , as proved by simple compu-
tation in Lemma 18 in Annex.
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pk(xdev)− pk(xˆ(ǫ1)) ≤
5ǫ21(M + ǫ1)
12K(m− ǫ1)
= Ψ(ǫ1)
On the other hand:
pk(xdev)
pk(xˆ(ǫ1))
=
pk(xˆ(ǫ1)) + pk(xdev)− pk(xˆ(ǫ1))
pk(xˆ(ǫ1))
= 1 +
pk(xdev)− pk(xˆ(ǫ1))
pk(xˆ(ǫ1))
But, combining equation (10) and Claim 3 of lemma 13, we have that:
pk(xdev)− pk(xˆ(ǫ1))
pk(xˆ(ǫ1))
≤
12ǫ1θ
(m− ǫ1)θ
=
12ǫ1
m− ǫ1
= Φ(ǫ1)
Our main result (Theorem 2) is a straightforward consequence of Proposition 16. Let
indeed ǫ1 be such that Ψ(ǫ1) ≤ ǫ (resp. Φ(ǫ1) ≤ ǫ), it exists since Ψ(ǫ1)→ 0 and Φ(ǫ1)→ 0
when ǫ1 → 0, and let n be such that n ≥ Ω(ǫ1), then xˆ(ǫ1) is an additive (resp. multiplica-
tive) ǫ equilibrium in H (n, S, f).
Because Φ(ǫ1) ≤ ǫ⇔ ǫ1 ≤
ǫm
12+ǫ , the existence of multiplicative equilibrium is guaranteed
when the number of players is larger than
N(ǫ) := Ω(
ǫm
12 + ǫ
) = 5Card(E)+
⌈
5L(M + ǫm12+ǫ)
m− ǫm12+ǫ
(
(12 + ǫ)K
2ǫm
+
1
minλe
)
+
3LK(12 + ǫ)
2ǫm
⌉
where L :=
∫
S
f(x)dx is the total quantity of consumers in the network, and minλe denotes
the minimal length among the set E of edges.
6 Annex
Lemma 17. Let ǫ1 ∈ (0,
minλeK
2 ), eˆ ∈ E and iˆ ∈ {0, . . . , Ie − 1}, then Ω(ǫ1) ≥ h(
ℓeˆg
iˆ
eˆ
10 , ǫ1)
where Ω(ǫ1) is defined in equation (7).
Proof. It follows from the definition of ℓe and the inequality m− ǫ1 ≤ ge ≤M + ǫ1 that:
h(
ℓeˆg
iˆ
eˆ
8
, ǫ1) =2Card(EL) +
∑
e
∑
i
⌈
10
2
ℓe(ǫ1)g
i
e
ℓeˆ(ǫ1)g
iˆ
eˆ
⌉
+ 2
∑
e
⌈
λeK
2ǫ1
⌉
≤2Card(EL) +
∑
e
⌈
λeK
2ǫ1
⌉5
λe
⌈
λeˆK
2ǫ1
⌉
(M + ǫ1)
λeˆ
⌈
λeK
2ǫ1
⌉
(m− ǫ1)

+ 2
∑
e
⌈
λeK
2ǫ1
⌉
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Moreover, because x ≤ ⌈x⌉ ≤ x+ 1 we also have:
h(
ℓeˆg
iˆ
eˆ
8
, ǫ1) ≤2Card(EL) +
∑
e
(
5
λe(
λeˆK
2ǫ1
+ 1)(M + ǫ1)
λeˆ(m− ǫ1)
)
+ 3
∑
e
⌈
λeK
2ǫ1
⌉
≤2Card(EL) +
5
2
∑
e
λeK(M + ǫ1)
ǫ1(m− ǫ1)
+
∑
e
5
λe
λeˆ
M + ǫ1
m− ǫ1
+ 3
∑
e
⌈
λeK
2ǫ1
⌉
Finally, we use the notation L :=
∑
e λe and the fact that
∑
e
⌈
λeK
2ǫ1
⌉
≤ Card(E) + LK2ǫ1 .
h(
ℓeˆg
iˆ
eˆ
8
, ǫ1) ≤2Card(EL) +
5LK(M + ǫ1)
2ǫ1(m− ǫ1)
+
5L
minλe
M + ǫ1
m− ǫ1
+ 3Card(E) +
3LK
2ǫ1
≤5Card(E) +
5L(M + ǫ1)
(m− ǫ1)
(
K
2ǫ1
+
1
minλe
)
+
3LK
2ǫ1
≤ Ω(ǫ1)
Lemma 18. If n ≥ Ω(ǫ1) then θ ≤
ǫ1(M+ǫ1)
4K
Proof. Remember that θ was defined in 8 as a real number such that n ≤ h(θ) ≤ n+
∑
e∈E Ie.
We suppose here that n ≥ Ω(ǫ1) and we have, thanks to 17, Ω(ǫ1) ≥ h(
ℓeg
i
e
10 , ǫ1). Putting all
these inequalities together gives:
h(θ, ǫ1) ≥ h(
ℓeg
i
e
10
, ǫ1)
Because h is a decreasing function, and replacing ℓ by its definition in Definition 8, we
get:
θ ≤
λeg
i
e
10
⌈
λeK
2ǫ1
⌉ ≤ ǫ1gie
5K
Using the inequality gie ≤M + ǫ we obtain:
θ ≤
ǫ1(M + ǫ1)
5K
References
Simon P Anderson, Jacob K Goeree, and Roald Ramer. Location, location, location. Journal
of Economic Theory, 77(1):102–127, 1997.
25
B Curtis Eaton and Richard G Lipsey. The principle of minimum differentiation recon-
sidered: Some new developments in the theory of spatial competition. The Review of
Economic Studies, pages 27–49, 1975.
Rainer Feldmann, Marios Mavronicolas, and Burkhard Monien. Nash equilibria for voronoi
games on transitive graphs. In Internet and Network Economics, pages 280–291. Springer,
2009.
Gae¨tan Fournier and Marco Scarsini. Hotelling games on networks: efficiency of equilibria.
Available at SSRN 2423345, 2014.
Pim Heijnen and Adriaan R Soetevent. Price competition on graphs. 2014.
Harold Hotelling. Stability in competition. Springer, 1929.
Phillip J Lederer and Arthur P Hurter Jr. Competition of firms: discriminatory pricing
and location. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 623–640, 1986.
Marios Mavronicolas, Burkhard Monien, Vicky G Papadopoulou, and Florian Schoppmann.
Voronoi games on cycle graphs. In Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2008,
pages 503–514. Springer, 2008.
Gabriel Montes-Rojas. Spatial competition and the location of firms with non-uniformly
distributed costumers. Revista de Economı´a Pol´ıtica de Buenos Aires, 14:83–107, 2015.
Damien J Neven. On hotelling’s competition with non-uniform customer distributions.
Economics Letters, 21(2):121–126, 1986.
Mat´ıas Nu´n˜ez and Marco Scarsini. Competing over a finite number of locations. Economic
Theory Bulletin, pages 1–12, 2014.
Matias Nu´n˜ez and Marco Scarsini. Large location models. Available at SSRN 2624304,
2015.
De´nes Pa´lvo¨lgyi. Hotelling on graphs. Technical report, Mimeo, 2011.
Hans Peters, Marc Schro¨der, and Dries Vermeulen. Waiting in the queue on hotelling’s
main street. Mimeo, 2015.
26
